Authorities are investigating potential threats to energy systems across the Nordic region, according to warnings issued Tuesday, February 26.
While the situation isn’t currently critical for Norway, officials say the developments shouldn’t come as a surprise.
Les saken: Trussel mot energisystemene i alle nordiske land
Sabotage in the Baltic Sea
On December 25, 2024, the Estlink 2 subsea power cable was damaged, significantly reducing electricity transmission between Finland and Estonia. The cables were severed, and the oil tanker Eagle S quickly became a suspect, accused of intentionally dragging its anchor across the cables.
WARNING: Jonas Kristiansen Nøland believes Norway is unprepared for sabotage. Photo: Agnete Brun
The vessel was linked to the Russian “shadow fleet” – a fleet operating anonymously and often suspected of illegal transport and sabotage. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas called the incident a serious attack on European energy security. The damage to critical infrastructure underscores the growing vulnerability of undersea cables.
This wasn’t the first, nor the last, attack on infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. Prior to this, between 2022 and 2025, there have been attacks on power cables, gas pipelines, communication cables, and other critical infrastructure, according to reports.
Also Read: Norway is Among the European Countries with the Worst Energy Security
Vulnerable Norwegian Infrastructure
Authorities now know that both Russia and China possess what appear to be cable cutters, giving them the capability to damage undersea cables. Norway has a total of seven subsea cables to other countries.
The energy war now unfolding in the maritime areas, and its consequences, remain unknown. This isn’t just about the vulnerability of the energy supply itself, but also about security and defense policy concerns. The fear of this is very real. In 2024, Sweden rejected 13 offshore wind farms in the Baltic Sea.
There may be something we’ve overlooked. While Norway’s offshore wind development is thoroughly assessed in terms of environmental impact and coexistence, the preparedness perspective – in light of the ongoing energy war – has been treated far more weakly.
Lack of Preparedness for Offshore Wind
In connection with the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate’s (NVE) consultation on tightened requirements for repair preparedness in the event of simultaneous sabotage incidents, offshore wind isn’t mentioned once. The same is true for Statnett’s report on the development of offshore grids for Norwegian offshore wind, which doesn’t address the vulnerabilities – except to note that a meshed offshore grid would be an advantage.
The Belgorod nuclear submarine was delivered to the Russian Navy in 2022. Weighing 30,000 tons when submerged and capable of speeds up to 60 km/h, the Belgorod illustrates Russia’s underwater capabilities. The most plausible scenario, yet, isn’t a collision inside a wind farm, but damage to a few critical points – or cyberattacks against the operating systems.
Floating offshore wind turbines are designed for extreme weather, but not for deliberate sabotage from underwater vessels. The question, isn’t whether offshore wind can be built, but whether we’re building new vulnerabilities at sea without having the preparedness in place.
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Critical Vulnerabilities at Sea
When repair preparedness is tightened for sabotage, offshore wind and subsea cables must be included in the same regulations – otherwise, we’ll be building a vulnerability at sea that we would never accept on land.
Large offshore wind farms and interconnectors are robust in operation, but they have few critical components. Damage to an export cable or converter can quickly halt large volumes, and experience from the Baltic Sea shows that underwater repairs often seize a long time.
Also Read: Southern Norway Has the Lowest Electricity Prices Thanks to Wind Power
The Threat to Transformer Stations
But the energy war isn’t just unfolding at sea. In Ukraine, transformer stations are being hit by drones. These transformer stations can have lead times of up to four years.
If we experience something similar in Norway, we have little to fall back on. The focus on more decentralized energy systems has never been greater.
The Energy War is Here Now
The question isn’t whether Norwegian energy infrastructure will be subjected to sabotage, but when – and whether we’re prepared. Preparedness and defense thinking must be incorporated as mandatory premises in all future planning of offshore wind and critical energy infrastructure.
The energy war isn’t a future threat. It’s happening now.
