Gulf States’ Security Mirage Shattered by Iran Conflict

Iranian missiles were suddenly falling near shopping malls, luxury skyscrapers, and ports filled with yachts, to the horror of Qataris, Emiratis, Kuwaitis, Bahrainis, Saudis, and Omanis, as well as tens of thousands of expatriates and tourists.

The war even reached some of the world’s most luxurious hotels. Debris from an intercepted Iranian drone fell on the Burj al Arab in Dubai, while the Fairmont The Palm, on the Palm Jumeirah artificial island, sustained a direct hit.

And on Wednesday, Qatar’s national oil company reported “considerable damage” from missile attacks on the Ras Laffan industrial complex.

Ras Laffan was among the sites mentioned by Iran in a warning that it would take “decisive measures” after its South Pars gas field facilities were reportedly hit by Israeli strikes.

The consequences are devastating, and anger is mounting in Gulf capitals.

A veritable tsunami of cancellations has hit these wealthy monarchies: flights, hotel reservations, congresses, and international events like Formula 1 in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

Adding to the disruption is the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which has hampered their fuel exports.

“Gulf countries have worked to forge an image of safe havens in the Middle East. The actions and events of the past week have tarnished that image,” Badr al Saif, a professor at Kuwait University and former deputy chief of staff to the Kuwaiti prime minister, acknowledged to BBC Mundo.

The region invested in luxury and security.

These autocratic monarchies heavily invested in surveillance, which kept them relatively safe from terrorism, but also suppressed dissent and anything that could harm their image.

Over the past three weeks, dozens of people – including foreigners – have been arrested for posting videos of the Iranian attacks.

In an attempt to attract expatriates, tourists, and international investors, these conservative Muslim nations created bubbles of permissiveness, but with limits: alcohol, yes, in certain places; public displays of homosexuality, no.

Combined with low or non-existent taxes, this made them extremely popular in recent decades, also becoming a major tourist destination.

But the war is testing all of these efforts.

The tourism industry alone is losing around $600 million per day in the region, according to data from the World Travel & Tourism Council, cited by the Financial Times.

The consortium had predicted that tourism would generate $207 billion for the region this year.

During the week of March 6th, more than 80,000 cancellations of short-term rentals were recorded in Dubai, according to data collected by AirDNA from reservations made on platforms like Airbnb and Vrbo.

Flight cancellations also grounded millions of passengers.

In recent decades, the Gulf has become a major international air connection hub, with more than 500,000 passengers transiting through it daily.

Since February 28th, at least three airports – those of Dubai, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi – have been hit by Iranian missiles or drones, leading to the cancellation of thousands of flights.

The image of security “was partly artificial, but also partly real, as the Gulf states had actually managed to isolate themselves from the worst regional violence for decades,” explains Elham Fakhro, a researcher at the Belfer Center at Harvard Kennedy School.

Restoring investor and tourist confidence “is possible,” Fakhro estimates, “but it will depend on how long the conflict lasts.”

The war with Iran, which has placed Gulf countries in the line of fire, is proving extremely costly and generating a sense of anger and frustration among their citizens and leaders.

The public figure who has most explicitly criticized the decision by Trump to draw them into the war is perhaps Emirati businessman Khalaf Ahmad al Habtoor.

“Who gave him the authority to drag our region into a war with Iran? And on what basis did he create this dangerous decision?” al Habtoor questioned in a recent, scathing open letter to the U.S. President, wondering if he had “assessed the collateral damage before pulling the trigger.”

“The sense of betrayal that reigns in Gulf capitals is considerable, although It’s unlikely to be expressed publicly for some time,” explains Elham Fakhro, a researcher at Harvard’s Belfer Center, to BBC Mundo.

Gulf countries have invested heavily in their relationship with Washington, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, including hosting its military bases, facilitating logistics, committing to massive investments, and bearing the internal political cost of aligning with U.S. Regional policy, which is deeply unpopular.

“In return, they expected, at a minimum, to be consulted before a war that would inevitably make them targets. This did not happen. Iranian missiles hit their capitals, their airports, their oil infrastructure, and their financial districts, not because of their own actions, but because of decisions made in Washington and Tel Aviv,” Fakhro emphasizes.

This isn’t the first time the U.S. Has sidelined them.

When the Iran nuclear deal was signed in 2015, “Gulf countries, who had always demanded to be involved in any pact with Tehran, were excluded.” This new snub “touches a nerve.”

Gulf monarchies have maintained a tense relationship with their Persian neighbor since the revolution that overthrew Shah Reza Pahlavi and proclaimed the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Iran is not an Arab country, its population is predominantly Shia – while the Gulf countries are predominantly Sunni – and, since the 1979 revolution, it has positioned itself as the United States’ great enemy in the region, with which the Arab monarchies are allied.

Gulf countries have built their security strategy around this link with Washington, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar.

“They all sought, in one way or another, to obtain something akin to Article 5 of NATO – the one stipulating that if one member is attacked, the others will arrive to its defense – whereby the United States would commit to protecting them,” analyzes Neil Quilliam.

The precedent of Kuwait in 1990 – invaded by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and then liberated by a coalition led by Washington – served as a reference.

But when Iran bombed oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia in 2019, or when Israel killed Hamas leaders in the Qatari capital, Doha, during a bombing in 2025, the United States remained silent.

“They have all, in one way or another, sought to obtain something akin to an Article 5 equivalent – the one stipulating that if one member is attacked, the others will come to its defense – whereby the United States would commit to protecting them,” analyzes Neil Quilliam.

The precedent of Kuwait in 1990 – invaded by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and then liberated by a coalition led by Washington – served as a reference.

But when Iran bombed oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia in 2019, or when Israel killed Hamas leaders in the Qatari capital, Doha, during a bombing in 2025, the United States remained silent.

The feeling that Washington would not come to their aid has grown, and some of these countries have begun to build their own defense industry and diversify their security partnerships.

According to Elham Fakhro, Gulf countries had built their security around three closely linked assumptions: that the United States would act as the main guarantor against external threats; that détente with Iran would reduce the risk of direct confrontation; and that, for some, establishing selective ties with Israel would bring strategic benefits.

These strategies “were aimed at allowing Gulf governments to maintain a balance between Washington, Tehran, and Tel Aviv, without having to choose between them,” emphasizes the Harvard Belfer Center researcher.

The war waged by Iran has highlighted the limits of this alliance.

What options do Gulf countries have now in a war they did not choose?

No uncomplicated solutions, experts say. But the damage will be less if the conflict ends quickly.

A short-term ceasefire would allow for the launch of a recovery narrative, estimates Elham Fakhro.

But a prolonged war would exacerbate the damage month after month, accelerate the departure of expatriate workers and the flight of capital on which economies like Dubai depend.

That’s not all. The economic hemorrhage caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz for Gulf countries can only be stopped sustainably by a ceasefire – never by force, as Trump wishes, estimates Neil Quilliam.

In any case, the losses will be enormous, as some countries have had to interrupt their production, and it will take them at least five or six months to return to pre-war levels.

Even if the war ended today, the threat from the Iranian regime – whose fall does not seem imminent – would continue to hang over the Gulf like a sword of Damocles.

“In two months, Israel could say it has detected movement in the nuclear or ballistic missile program and that it is resuming strikes,” envisions the Chatham House researcher. “And then the Iranians will retaliate.”

As Anna Jacobs Khalaf, from the European Council on Foreign Relations, points out, Gulf countries “cannot change the geography”: they are neighbors of a vast country of 90 million inhabitants and “will have to find a way to coexist with the new Iranian leaders to prevent them from continuing to