Cellebrite Hacking Tool Limited Access to Recent Pixel Phones, GrapheneOS Offers Greater Security
A recently leaked document suggests that the Cellebrite hacking tool, used by law enforcement, has limited capabilities when accessing data on recent Google Pixel phones, and is significantly less effective against devices running the GrapheneOS mobile operating system.
According to the leaked information, Cellebrite technology can extract data from Pixel 6, 7, 8, and 9 phones in unlocked, “AFU” (After First Unlock), and “BFU” (Before First Unlock) states while running stock software. However, the tool cannot bypass passcodes to gain full control of the devices. Law enforcement officials have also reportedly noted ongoing difficulties in copying eSIMs from Pixel phones, a challenge that may become more significant as the Pixel 10 series is expected to phase out physical SIM cards.
The document indicates a substantial security advantage for Pixel phones running GrapheneOS. Cellebrite’s access is restricted to devices running software predating late 2022, with newer builds – including those on the Pixel 8 and 9 – proving resistant even when unlocked. As of late 2024, even a fully unlocked GrapheneOS device reportedly prevents data extraction, limiting inspection to user-accessible information. This highlights the growing importance of privacy-focused operating systems in an era of increasing digital surveillance.
The source of the leak claims to have monitored two briefings without being detected, but subsequently identified a meeting organizer. Google has been contacted for comment on why GrapheneOS, a custom ROM developed by a small non-profit, demonstrates greater resistance to industrial phone hacking than its official Pixel OS. GrapheneOS focuses on security and privacy enhancements, and this incident underscores the potential benefits of such approaches.
Cellebrite is expected to increase scrutiny of meeting attendees following the leak, and a response from Google is anticipated regarding the security discrepancies.
This blurry screenshot appears to list which Pixel phones Cellebrite devices can hack.
Credit:
rogueFed
At least according to Cellebrite, GrapheneOS is more secure than what Google offers out of the box. The company is telling law enforcement in these briefings that its technology can extract data from Pixel 6, 7, 8, and 9 phones in unlocked, AFU, and BFU states on stock software. However, it cannot brute-force passcodes to enable full control of a device. The leaker also notes law enforcement is still unable to copy an eSIM from Pixel devices. Notably, the Pixel 10 series is moving away from physical SIM cards.
For those same phones running GrapheneOS, police can expect to have a much harder time. The Cellebrite table says that Pixels with GrapheneOS are only accessible when running software from before late 2022—both the Pixel 8 and Pixel 9 were launched after that. Phones in both BFU and AFU states are safe from Cellebrite on updated builds, and as of late 2024, even a fully unlocked GrapheneOS device is immune from having its data copied. An unlocked phone can be inspected in plenty of other ways, but data extraction in this case is limited to what the user can access.
The original leaker claims to have dialed into two calls so far without detection. However, rogueFed also called out the meeting organizer by name (the second screenshot, which we are not reposting). Odds are that Cellebrite will be screening meeting attendees more carefully now.
We’ve reached out to Google to inquire about why a custom ROM created by a small non-profit is more resistant to industrial phone hacking than the official Pixel OS. We’ll update this article if Google has anything to say.
