As U.S. And Israeli attacks on Iran expand, a long-standing question in military thinking resurfaces: can air power, no matter how precise or intense, definitively determine the fate of a political system?
A review of reporting from the Wall Street Journal and analysis by American author Hal Brands for Bloomberg suggests the answer is far from certain.
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Military experience generally indicates that airstrikes can inflict significant damage on an adversary and weaken its military capabilities, but rarely are they sufficient on their own to achieve the political outcome wars seek.
According to the Wall Street Journal report, modern military history offers no clear example of a regime being overthrown and replaced solely through air strikes.
The United States has toppled governments in previous wars, but those operations – the newspaper notes – were only successful when combined with the presence of ground forces, whether American or local.
The newspaper adds that U.S. President Donald Trump, from the early days of the conflict, linked the air campaign to the possibility of regime change in Iran. Hours after the strikes began, he called on Iranians to revolt, suggesting it might be “their last chance for generations.”
However, the report too indicates that the U.S. Military establishment appeared more cautious in outlining war objectives, with military leaders publicly emphasizing that the immediate goal was to destroy Iran’s offensive capabilities – namely ballistic missiles, drones and naval assets – as well as what remains of its nuclear program.
This disparity between political rhetoric and military assessment reveals a deeper issue. The data in the Wall Street Journal report suggests that air power may be an effective tool for weakening Iran militarily, but it offers no guarantee of toppling the regime itself – a scenario historical experience suggests is rare.
Testing the Resilience of the Iranian Regime
The Wall Street Journal reports that, even after the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in an airstrike, there have been no clear signs of the Iranian system fracturing. Institutions of governance moved quickly, with the Assembly of Experts convening and selecting his son, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, as his successor.
The report also notes that the security and military infrastructure underpinning the regime remains intact. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps comprises approximately 190,000 personnel, alongside more than 300,000 soldiers in the regular army, plus 600,000 members of the Basij militia who the regime can mobilize if needed, according to data cited by the report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Experts cited by the newspaper suggest that any actual collapse of the regime might be signaled by indicators such as defections within the security apparatus, refusal to carry out orders, or widespread social unrest like oil worker strikes.
However, some experts believe – according to the report – that such indicators have not yet appeared, and may not appear easily, as elites connected to the regime see its survival as guaranteeing their interests.
the report suggests that airstrikes may weaken the Iranian state, but do not necessarily guarantee the overthrow of the regime, opening the door to a more complex scenario in which the political system remains in place even as state institutions suffer significant damage.
Limits of Air Power Theory
The Wall Street Journal report revisits the intellectual roots of the debate, noting that the idea of decisive air power dates back to Italian General Giulio Douhet, who in the 1920s theorized that striking a state’s “vital centers” – such as industry and communications – could break a society’s will and lead to surrender.
However, subsequent historical experience, the report explains, has not fully validated this premise. Air strikes contributed to weakening Germany during World War II, but were not the decisive factor, as the war was ultimately settled by the Allied ground offensive.
The report also points to examples like the 1991 Gulf War, where, despite its intensity, the conflict did not end until a short ground offensive.
It also cites later examples such as the Kosovo War in 1999 or the intervention in Libya in 2011, where air power played an vital role, but was always linked to the presence of local forces on the ground or a credible threat of ground intervention.
Display of Strength and the Potential for Depletion
Hal Brands’ analysis in Bloomberg goes beyond the battlefield to place the war in its broader strategic context. The campaign against Iran, he argues, simultaneously reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the United States.
On one hand, Brands believes the military campaign demonstrates Washington’s ability to deploy its long-range strike power and work with influential military allies like Israel. He also argues that this display of force could enhance the image of American deterrence and prompt adversaries to reconsider their calculations.
But Brands cautions that deterrence does not rely on perception alone, but also on actual military resources.
He points out that the war has consumed large quantities of Tomahawk missiles and precision munitions, in addition to air defense systems used to intercept Iranian retaliation.
He adds that the United States may have used as many of these missiles in the first few days of the war as it produces in a year, raising questions about the ability of U.S. Military stockpiles to withstand a prolonged conflict.
The pressure is not limited to ammunition, according to Brands, but extends to equipment and forces as well. Deploying forces in the region puts a strain on the U.S. Navy fleet, including the aircraft carrier Gerald Ford, which is participating in one of the longest continuous deployments in U.S. Navy history.
The author also notes that the U.S. Army is not designed to fight multiple major wars simultaneously, and that the defense industrial base may not be able to replenish sophisticated munitions quickly enough if the war drags on.
The Dilemma of American Strategy
Brands warns in his article that these pressures come at a sensitive strategic moment. According to U.S. Defense strategy, China represents the primary challenge to the United States, especially if a conflict breaks out with Taiwan.
But a continuing war in the Middle East could deplete the military resources Washington needs in that potential confrontation. Every missile fired in the Gulf – according to Brands – widens the gap in U.S. Military stockpiles that may be needed in a larger conflict in the Pacific Ocean.
neither the Wall Street Journal report nor Hal Brands’ analysis offers a definitive judgment on the course of the war, as the outcome of the bet on air power remains to be seen in the coming weeks.
If the war ends quickly and Iran emerges weakened to the point of disrupting its ability to threaten the region, supporters of the campaign may see the airstrikes as having achieved their goals.
However, if the regime endures despite the losses, or the war turns into a prolonged confrontation that depletes American resources, it may turn into clear that the bet on air power was not as simple as it initially appeared.
Air power, as suggested by the experiences reviewed in the report and analysis, is capable of destroying a great deal of military capability, but does not appear to be sufficient on its own to create the political system that may come after the war.
