Iran-US Tensions: Military Drills & Arms Deals Near Ormuz Strait

Iran’s military conducted exercises in late February, signaling a readiness to respond to potential conflict amid heightened tensions with the United States. The drills, which included live-fire exercises, come as Washington maintains a significant military presence in the region and Tehran continues to assert its capabilities.

Irán and the United States are scheduled to hold a third round of nuclear negotiations in Geneva on Thursday. The previous two meetings have not yielded results.

On February 24th, units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces carried out maneuvers at the Madinah ol Munawarah operational base in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan province, as well as on unspecified islands in the Persian Gulf. The base is located near the coast of the Strait of Hormuz, a key shipping lane through which approximately one-fifth of the world’s traded oil passes.

According to an analysis by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the islands referenced are likely the Nazeat Islands, located west of the strait and hosting IRGC facilities. These positions would allow Tehran to project power and potentially obstruct navigation in the event of regional escalation.

In recent weeks, Iranian military officials have warned they could attack ships in the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation for a potential U.S. Strike. In that context, the exercise reportedly focused on “sea-to-coast fire” operations, aimed at neutralizing vessels approaching the Iranian coastline.

The maneuvers included the use of drones for target identification and Shahed attack drones for their neutralization. Iranian officials also reported the use of new missile systems and simulated scenarios of both offensive and defensive electronic warfare.

Days earlier, on February 16th, the IRGC Navy carried out the “Intelligent Control of the Strait of Hormuz” exercise, during which – according to a Turkish media outlet on February 21st – a naval version of the “Seyed-3” air defense missile was launched. The system is reportedly designed to offer a “regional air defense umbrella” to advanced vessels such as the Shahid Soleimani class, reinforcing the Iranian fleet’s air defense capabilities in the Gulf waters.

Former President Donald Trump has demanded that Iran negotiate the elimination of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, a demand Tehran rejects. As a measure of pressure, Washington has carried out the largest military deployment in the Middle East since the invasion of Iraq, with two aircraft carriers, several destroyers and dozens of fighter jets.

International analyst Carlos Novoa told El Comercio that Iran does have the capacity to close or destabilize maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, but only temporarily. “It could do so for a couple of days, maybe two or three, not more,” he said, warning that the United States has sufficient military power to quickly neutralize any offensive or attempt to blockade by the Iranian regime. The development underscores growing regional tensions.

Andrés Gómez de la Torre, a specialist in defense and intelligence, said that Iran approaches a potential conflict with the United States from a “defensive and asymmetric” logic, marked by a conception of resistance warfare and by the limitations of a military apparatus that, according to him, was severely weakened after the 12-day war with Israel last June. The announcement could influence future diplomatic talks.

He believes the Iranian defense system was “strongly hit” by Israel, as well as by intelligence actions attributed to Mossad and other agencies. That combination of attacks and sabotage, he explained, left Tehran with “slowed” capabilities, hard to rebuild in a few months.

In that scenario, Iran would opt for a strategy of attrition and indirect response, relying on its experience in the so-called “fire belt,” that is, the network of non-state actors that make up the so-called Axis of Resistance. That structure could activate parallel fronts and expand the risk of regionalization of the conflict, with indirect actions against Israel.

The Strait of Hormuz would remain – according to the analyst – a strategic pressure card in the event of escalation.

Iran Seeks Military Support from Russia and China

Iran has also intensified its efforts with its allies Russia and China, who are also Washington’s main strategic adversaries, in an attempt to strengthen its military capabilities.

According to the Financial Times, citing leaked Russian documents and sources familiar with the agreement, Tehran signed a contract with Moscow in December 2025 to acquire 500 Verba portable air defense systems, along with 2,500 9M336 infrared-guided missiles, designed to intercept drones, cruise missiles, and low-flying aircraft.

The order was reportedly requested just days after the war with Israel, a conflict that exposed Iran’s defensive weaknesses.

Reuters reported on February 24th that Iran is “close” to closing a deal with China to purchase CM-302 anti-ship cruise missiles. According to six sources with knowledge of the negotiations, Tehran is also in talks with Beijing to acquire portable anti-aircraft systems, anti-ballistic weapons, and even anti-satellite capabilities. Although these negotiations began two years ago, they have accelerated dramatically after the confrontation with Israel.

For the ISW, the background to these negotiations is clear: Iran is trying to fill critical gaps in its air defense network. However, it indicated that the Verba systems cannot replace the S-300s that Israel destroyed in attacks carried out in April and October 2024. Moscow, for its part, has been reluctant to transfer the more advanced S-400s to Tehran, presumably because it needs them to sustain its own war in Ukraine.

Novoa believes the search for Russian air defense systems and Chinese missiles reveals Iran’s attempt to rebuild an air force and defense systems damaged in the war with Israel.

However, Novoa relativizes the scope of that cooperation. Although Russia and China will maintain diplomatic support for Tehran and criticize Washington in international forums, they will not risk a direct confrontation, so “they are not going to help Iran with weapons.”

Novoa indicated that Moscow remains focused on the war in Ukraine and President Vladimir Putin maintains channels of dialogue with Donald Trump. While Beijing prioritizes its long-term strategy and the delicate balance around Taiwan, as well as its structural competition with the United States.

“In realpolitik, neither Russia nor China will risk everything they have to defend Iran,” Novoa concluded.

Gómez de la Torre stressed that while Iran has strengthened military cooperation with Russia – a country to which it transferred drone technology that is now key on the Ukrainian front – bilateral agreements do not include mutual defense clauses, unlike the pacts that Moscow maintains with North Korea.

Russia, he added, has been reluctant to supply S-400 air defense systems to Iran and, although it offered Sukhoi-35 fighters, it did so in limited quantities compared to the air and naval power that the United States could deploy in the region.

That Russian caution is linked not only to its own military needs in the war against Ukraine, but also to its political calculation regarding Trump’s position, who has proposed conditions for a possible negotiated exit from the conflict with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Direct involvement in favor of Tehran could complicate those balances, the analyst emphasized.

In the case of China, Gómez de la Torre considered that Beijing would also act with prudence. Beyond eventual technological support, it would prioritize its own strategic agenda and the management of its tensions with Washington before committing frontally in defense of the Islamic Republic.

for Gómez de la Torre, Iran is preparing to resist more than to project a conventional war: with diminished capabilities, limited external support and a bet on asymmetric deterrence as its main tool against a potential clash with the United States.