Just years after achieving independence, Senegal faced a critical test of its fledgling democracy in December 1962. A power struggle between President Léopold Sédar Senghor adn Prime Minister Mamadou Dia escalated into a constitutional crisis, drawing the nation’s military into a delicate and perhaps destabilizing situation. BBC News Afrique now revisits this pivotal moment, examining how the Senegalese army navigated this challenge-and notably refrained from intervention-in a region often marked by military coups.
Crédit photo, Getty Images
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- Author, Abdou Aziz Diédhiou
- Role, BBC News Afrique
In 1962, just a few years after gaining independence, Senegal faced a major political crisis that would ultimately shape the nation’s future. As the country’s two most powerful figures, President Léopold Sédar Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, clashed in a power struggle, both sides turned to the security forces to assert dominance. Unexpectedly, the Senegalese military was called upon to resolve the crisis without seizing power for itself.
BBC News Afrique revisits this pivotal moment, with analysis from a historian, to understand the role the Senegalese army played in a political crisis that nearly plunged the young nation into uncertainty.
According to research by American scholars Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne, specialists in coups and political transitions, nearly 70% of coups worldwide occur on the African continent.
Since 2000, three-quarters of successful coups in Africa have taken place in former French colonies.
Burkina Faso leads the list of African nations with the most military coups, having experienced seven to date.
Data from the American researchers indicates that 45 African countries have experienced at least one attempt to overthrow the government.
Senegal stands out as a rare exception among these nations.
In its 65 years of independence, the Senegalese military has never attempted to seize power. This stability is particularly notable given the prevalence of military interventions elsewhere in the region.
To put this in perspective, all 15 other West African countries have experienced military coups.
The Senegalese army had several opportunities to intervene, most notably during the December 1962 political crisis between President Léopold Sédar Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia.
The Political System in Senegal in 1962
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Understanding the army’s role in the 1962 crisis requires examining the political landscape of Senegal in its early years of independence. The country operated under a bicameral parliamentary system.
President Senghor held limited real power, but served as the Secretary-General of the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS), the ruling party which controlled nearly all seats in the National Assembly.
Prime Minister Dia, on the other hand, wielded most of the executive power within the government. However, within the UPS, he ranked second to President Senghor.
The Political Crisis Between Senghor and Dia
Crédit photo, (Photo by AFP) (Photo by -/AFP via Getty Images)
Many political analysts and historians who have studied the 1962 crisis believe it stemmed from deep disagreements over economic and political direction for the country’s future.
In an article published by the journal Indépendant Afrique XXI, Etienne Smith, a lecturer in political science at Sciences-Po Bordeaux and a researcher at the LAM laboratory, writes that “the disagreements concerned proposed structural reforms of the Senegalese economy put forward by Dia and his team, and Senghor’s desire to appease the convergent economic interests of the former colonial power, the Senegalese business bourgeoisie, and the marabout elites, as well as some business-minded deputies.”
In any case, these disagreements escalated into “a struggle between clans and organized groups defending their interests and seeking to maintain power within the UPS, the ruling party,” explains Mouhamadou Moustapha Sow, a researcher in contemporary political history at the University Cheikh Anta Diop of Dakar and president of the Association of Senegalese Historians (AHS).
Sow notes that the clashes between Senghor and Dia began shortly after the breakup with Sudan in August 1960, developing and affecting all segments of Senegalese political society.
The historian points out that even before the vote of no confidence on December 14, 1962, which ignited the conflict, “the struggles between clans in the interior regions and within the sections and sub-sections, the regional UPS coordination bodies had reached such a peak that implosion was inevitable.”
“Today, we can safely establish that this was a crisis of the parliamentary system in force in Senegal from 1960 to 1962,” he argues in an interview with BBC News Afrique.
Understanding the Sequence of Events in the Political Crisis
The crisis itself erupted when a group of UPS deputies introduced a motion of censure against the government led by Mamadou Dia on December 14, 1962, despite being members of the same party. The deputies accused Dia of “governmental abuses” related to the state of emergency law in effect since August 1960, following the dissolution of the Mali Federation.
“President Mamadou Dia believed that this motion of censure could not be put to a vote without prior discussion within the party,” recalls Mouhamadou Moustapha Sow.
This obstructionist stance led to a standoff with the pro-Senghor camp, determined to remove Dia from power.
Unable to find another solution, the President of the Council deployed gendarmes from Thiès and other inland cities to clear the National Assembly, where deputies were gathered to vote on the motion of censure against his government.
During this operation, four deputies who initiated the motion of censure were arrested by order of the President of the Council before being released the same day.
“This show of force is what is presented as a coup d’état,” explains the Senegalese historian.
He adds, “It can be admitted that mistakes were made on both sides. The President of the Council (Dia) did not have the prerogative to arrest deputies and prevent them from meeting in their chamber. President Senghor, by calling on the parachute forces in the morning of December 17th, also violated the prerogatives of his Prime Minister, who was the only one authorized to mobilize the defense and security forces.”
In any case, “it is fair to recognize that there was never any desire for a coup d’état on the part of the President of the Council,” Sow believes.
However, some analysts argue that Senghor, relying on Article 24 of the Senegalese Constitution of August 29, 1960, which conferred upon him the quality of “guardian of the Constitution and in the exercise of his powers of arbitration,” had the prerogative to call on security forces in situations like the one in December 1962.
Thus, after replacing Chief of Staff Amadou Fall, who was loyal to Dia, with Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Alfred Diallo on the morning of December 17th, Senghor called on the paratroopers under Captain Preira to regain control of the situation.
What the Senegalese Army Did During the Political Crisis
Crédit photo, (Photo by JOHN WESSELS/AFP via Getty Images)
During this political crisis, “the army played a role as an arbiter between the protagonists of the conflict,” namely Mamadou Dia and Léopold Sédar Senghor, notes Mouhamadou Moustapha Sow.
“At the height of the tension, the heads of the defense and security forces met during the night of December 17-18, 1962, to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict and end the crisis,” he says.
“The main officers, including Lieutenant Colonel Jean Alfred Diallo, appointed Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in the midst of the crisis, Lieutenant Ahmet Fall, Director of the Gendarmerie, and Commander Tamsir BA, head of the Republican Guard, went to meet Presidents Senghor, Dia, and Lamine Guèye (President of the National Assembly) to find a political solution to the crisis,” he continues.
This “initiative by the Senegalese army helped to safeguard the republican order,” Sow maintains, specifying that “no shots were fired, and no blood was shed.”
Why the Army Did Not Take Power in 1962
Crédit photo, (Photo de Cem Ozdel/Anadolu via Getty Images)
The political crisis of December 17 and 18, 1962, which caused great confusion and uncertainty about who held power, was a golden opportunity for power-hungry military officials.
However, in Senegal, despite this general confusion, the army did not seize power and merely smoothed things over between the different political factions vying for control to “safeguard the republican institutions.”
According to Mouhamadou Moustapha Sow, several reasons can be cited to explain the Senegalese army’s republican behavior at this critical moment.
“In December 1962, Senegalese military personnel had already had a similar first experience with the collapse of the Mali Federation (August 1960). Neither the Senegalese nor Sudanese military expressed any desire to seize power,” he recalls.
“This federal experience, in my view, was a founding experience for the young Senegalese army,” he believes, adding, “That is why when the political crisis opposing Presidents Senghor and Dia broke out, the army wanted to remain equidistant and did not want to seize power, which was within its reach.”
There are also other aspects relating to the training of Senegalese military personnel to be taken into consideration in the analysis, according to Sow.
“It appears that the fact that Senegalese officers were trained from this period in the great French military schools, where they were initiated into the principles and values that underpin a state of law, a republican state, may have had an effect on their relationship with political power,” he says.
“And we can also argue that the socio-political traditions of Senegal, based on dialogue and consultation between political actors and men in uniform, promote respect for the areas of competence of each category of actors and respect for hierarchy,” he added.
One thing is certain: the political crisis of 1962 redrew the face of political power in Senegal, which shifted from a bicameral parliamentary system to a hyper-presidentialist system as we know it today.
