Venezuela: Delcy’s Rule, US Strategy & the Path to Democracy

Nearly three months after the capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. Forces, Venezuela is at a critical juncture, prompting a reassessment of potential paths forward. The current situation, led by Delcy Rodríguez, is being weighed against alternative scenarios that were previously considered, including a transition under María Corina Machado and recommendations outlined by analyst Benjamín Tripier. This comes as the country grapples with political and economic uncertainty following Maduro’s removal from power.

The meeting between Rodríguez and U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Laura Dogu at the Miraflores presidential palace on February 2, 2026, underscores the complex negotiations underway as Washington seeks to stabilize the nation and guide it toward a democratic future. Dogu, who arrived in Caracas the previous day with a U.S. Delegation, reiterated the three phases outlined by Secretary of State Marco Rubio: stabilization, economic recovery, and a transition to democratic rule.

According to recent polling data, public opinion is overwhelmingly against Rodríguez’s leadership. A February 2026 survey by Meganálisis found that 90.1% of Venezuelans do not want Rodríguez leading the transition, with 68.4% dismissing the recent amnesty as a sham. The same poll showed Machado with 82.4% support compared to 4.8% for Rodríguez in a head-to-head matchup. The case highlights the deep divisions within Venezuelan society and the widespread desire for change.

Another survey, conducted by V Encuesta in March 2026, revealed that 38.9% of Venezuelans perceive a “transition toward a change of power,” while 33.1% believe it’s simply a continuation of the Chavista regime under a new guise. A majority, 68.2%, anticipate economic improvement in the next six months, though this remains largely an expectation rather than a current reality. The poll also indicated that 56.8% evaluate Rodríguez’s performance as “good/very good,” but nearly 30% did not respond, potentially indicating fear or distrust.

The ISEE poll, also from March 2026, showed an overall optimistic index of 71.2, with positive outlooks on the country’s economy, household income, and employment. However, it also revealed a critical pessimism regarding basic goods prices. This suggests that while people anticipate improvements, they are wary of rising costs eroding any gains.

A report by Gold Glove/Atlantic Council (February 2026) indicated a pragmatic minority overestimating acceptance of Rodríguez, with most desiring political change but prioritizing economic recovery. The report noted that Washington may be overestimating this pragmatism.

International Analysis: Economic Opening Without Political Credibility

Publications like The Economist and World Politics Review have described the current situation as an “economic opening without political credibility,” noting that inflation remains above 600% annually as of March 2026. The narrative of a “revival” is seen as serving U.S. Domestic policy more than the actual Venezuelan reality.

A comparative analysis reveals key differences between the current path under Rodríguez, a potential transition led by Machado, and the recommendations put forth by Tripier. The table below details these distinctions across dimensions of power, the military, oil policy, amnesty, and relations with the U.S.

A key distinction is that neither Machado nor Tripier would accept coexisting with Delcy and the Chavista leadership. Their position is imprisonment and extradition for Cabello, Delcy, Jorge Rodríguez, and Padrino López, with no deal for impunity. The difference lies in how to achieve this: Machado and Tripier with executive power from the start, with strict conditions forcing their removal.

The lobbying efforts of Chevron and Sargeant, through the CIA, have influenced the U.S. To support Delcy and block ExxonMobil’s entry, reflecting a prioritization of security and energy over democratization. The move underscores the competing interests at play in Venezuela’s future.

• Top-down vs. bottom-up: Should the U.S. Revise its strategy?

Current U.S. Approach (top-down with Delcy):

• Relies on an interlocutor with de facto power (weapons, territory, apparatus).
• Prioritizes “managed stability” and oil flows.
• Assumes the Chavista “sting” is no longer a threat because the apparatus is “under control.”
• Fundamental flaw: Underestimates the Chavista’s capacity to rearm with illicit revenues and control of the FANB; overestimates the pragmatism of a minority that accepts Delcy as a temporary measure.

Machado/Tripier approach (bottom-up with popular legitimacy):

• Starts with someone who has massive social support (82.4% vs. 4.8%).
• Ties every economic concession to a verifiable political milestone.
• Does not give a blank check to “convenient” interlocutors who lack legitimacy.
• Fundamental strength: Aligns internal and external legitimacy; reduces the risk that the same destroyers monopolize the rebound revenue.

Should the U.S. Integrate top-down with bottom-up?

Yes, urgently. The optimal path is not Delcy vs. Machado as an exclusive binary, but:

1. Maintain top-down pressure on Cabello/Delcy (sanctions, legal action, strict conditionality).
2. Build a direct bottom-up relationship with Machado, civil society, free media, and patriotic sectors of the FANB.
3. Tie every top-down concession (sanctions relief, oil contracts) to verifiable bottom-up progress (real releases, electoral timeline, transparency, disarmament of collectives).
4. Don’t be held hostage by Delcy: if she/Cabello boycott the transition, have a Plan B with Machado ready to assume government.

This integrated approach is essentially the Tripier proposal: use top-down levers to create space for the bottom-up, not to consolidate actors without legitimacy.

• Conclusion: Did Washington get it right?

With Chavismo 3.0: Recycled power, economy with a little more oxygen, society overwhelmingly rejecting Delcy and desiring Machado. Chavismo is rearming “one day at a time” with illicit revenues; torturers in charge of the FANB.

With Machado: Turbulent start but a healthy correlation between power and the people; the “sting” beginning to be dismantled; restructuring of the FANB; clear timeline toward elections.

With the BT approach: Informed realism; every barrel tied to democracy; less room for recycling; dismantling of criminal structures.

The question is not only whether the decision was “right,” but what kind of order the U.S. Supports: one comfortable for the Chevron/Sargeant lobby via the CIA, or one consistent with the will of the country and an escape from the crisis. The Chavistas have deceived successive U.S. Administrations promising reforms they never delivered. They are doing exactly the same now. It is up to democratic actors—both inside and outside the country—to decide whether the scorpion will cross the river without using its sting, or whether it will finally be disarmed before it strikes again.

It is impossible to build a first-world economy on a third-world control architecture.

Contacto: