A public dispute between Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, Lebanon’s most powerful Shia political blocs, has surfaced over the appointment of a civilian to lead ceasefire negotiations with Israel [[1]]. The disagreement, centering on former Ambassador Simon Karam, reveals deepening fissures within the historically aligned “Shia duo” and threatens to further destabilize Lebanon’s already fragile political landscape [[3]]. This internal conflict comes as Lebanon grapples with an economic crisis and ongoing efforts to delineate its southern border with Israel following recent maritime boundary negotiations [[1]].
A public rift has emerged within Lebanon’s powerful Shia alliance between Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, signaling potential instability in the country’s already fragile political landscape. The disagreement centers on the appointment of a civilian to lead the Lebanese delegation to a committee monitoring the ceasefire with Israel.
Naim Qassem, deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah, strongly opposed the selection of former Ambassador Simon Karam to head the delegation, calling it “another misstep” following what he described as a “mistake” – the government’s August decision to formally regulate the group’s armed wing.
This unusually public rebuke of a decision coordinated directly with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, leader of the Amal Movement, has brought internal tensions to the forefront and revealed the extent of friction between the two groups at a critical political juncture.
Deepening Divisions?
Political analyst George Al-Aqouri suggests the dispute between Qassem and Berri reveals “the depth of the crisis facing the Shia duo and the pressure that could end their power-sharing arrangement.” He added that “increasing risks… place more and more responsibility on Berri’s shoulders,” noting that supporters of both parties “are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the other.”
While Berri reportedly agreed to Karam’s appointment, Al-Aqouri says he attempted to appear noncommittal, suggesting he wasn’t consulted – a claim officials have refuted. Al-Aqouri characterized this as a “ploy that may not even convince the duo’s own base.”
Retired Brigadier General Naji Malaeb, a strategic expert, observed that Berri’s approval reflected “a clear difference between his position and Qassem’s,” explaining that Berri “did not object to the principle of a civilian representative… but to the specific individual.”
Malaeb added that the arms restriction decision, previously criticized by Qassem as a “misstep,” is being actively implemented south of the Litani River. However, he doesn’t believe these differing stances indicate internal turmoil or impending changes, nor are they merely tactical maneuvers.
Malaeb believes Berri “has a clear vision,” having negotiated the understanding with U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein that halted the recent fighting. This agreement was reached with Hezbollah’s approval.
Ali Amin, editor-in-chief of the “Janoubia” website, downplayed the significance of the disagreement. He argued that civilian participation in negotiations doesn’t represent a fracture between Hezbollah and Amal, emphasizing that “Berri’s approval cannot be separated from prior coordination with the party.”
Amin told “Al Hurra” that Hezbollah’s opposition to a civilian in the “Mechanism” committee was “a principled stance rather than a declaration of opposition to negotiations with Israel,” noting that “no indications of actual objection have emerged, either on the ground or politically.”
However, Amin suggested that “developments related to the level of negotiations, shifts in the regional and international balance of power, and their repercussions on Lebanon, may lead to the emergence of differences between the two parties due to conflicting interests. Specifically regarding the exclusivity of arms and ending Hezbollah’s military presence, and the entry of Arab actors, which will to some extent replace the decline of Iranian influence.”
A Renewed Old Conflict
The relationship between the Amal Movement and Hezbollah has not always been smooth. Hezbollah, founded in 1982 from within the Amal Movement – established by Imam Musa al-Sadr in 1974 and later led by Nabih Berri – quickly emerged as a rival for influence within the Shia community. This competition manifested in armed clashes during the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990).
Following the end of the Civil War and the signing of the Taif Agreement, a reconciliation was achieved between the two groups, dubbed “the warring brothers.” The settlement, brokered by Syria and Iran, was described as a “marriage of necessity.” Since then, they have been known as “the Shia duo.”
Al-Aqouri recalls that the relationship between the two parties “was not initially built on a shared political project, but on converging interests between Iran and Syria in the 1990s, which stopped the bloody ‘brothers’ war’ between them, and then what brought them together later was the common interest of each party, whether at the personal level of their leaders or for the benefit of the component they represent.”
Observers note that Berri’s role has gradually diminished as his policies have become increasingly aligned with Hezbollah’s, particularly after the party’s expanded regional influence following the 2006 war and its intervention in the Syrian conflict. This shift has led many Lebanese to view Berri as a “political appendage” of Hezbollah.
Following the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, Berri re-emerged as a key political reference for the Shia community, particularly after being tasked by Qassem with leading efforts to achieve a ceasefire.
“Berri knows full well that clinging to the party’s policy will lead the Lebanese, especially the Shia component, to the abyss,” Al-Aqouri stated.
Positions Without Impact?
Following Karam’s appointment, Lebanon and Israel held a direct meeting within the committee tasked with monitoring the ceasefire, a step the Lebanese presidency described as necessary to avoid a new military confrontation. President Joseph Aoun affirmed that “the language of negotiation does not mean relinquishing sovereignty,” while Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant warned that Israel “will not hesitate to act forcefully in Lebanon again” if Hezbollah does not relinquish its weapons by the end of the year.
Al-Aqouri considers Karam’s appointment “transcends the technical level,” noting that he is “a seasoned politician known for his firm sovereign positions,” and that Qassem’s statements are “political chatter” aimed at appeasing the party’s base without the ability to influence events.
Malaeb pointed to “increasing American flexibility” after Karam’s appointment, noting that U.S. envoy Tom Barrack, who previously described Lebanon as a “failed state,” “changed his tone after the army leadership’s statement regarding the arms restriction operations in the South.”
The Lebanese government has set a deadline for completing arms restriction operations south of the Litani River by the end of the year, with subsequent phases to follow, while Hezbollah rejects any discussion of its weapons north of the river.
Malaeb added that Barrack himself acknowledged that “Israel is unable to eliminate Hezbollah’s weapons, making the stage of absorbing the weapons, as Prime Minister Nawaf Salam pointed out, or preventing their use, the path that international parties are pushing towards,” stressing that Qassem’s positions “will not affect this context, and will not change anything in the political or security reality.”
