A long-held theory of international relations – that great powers often seek dominance not through direct conflict, but by weakening rivals – is playing out on the world stage, most notably in Ukraine. An in-depth analysis reveals how the conflict has evolved into a proxy war with global implications,where major players are strategically positioning themselves too exhaust opposing forces and reshape the international order. The following report details how this dynamic is unfolding, and the calculations being made in Moscow, Washington, and Beijing as the war continues into its third year.
The dynamics of international power often lead major nations to seek regional dominance, not through direct confrontation, but by weakening rivals, according to a prominent theory outlined in John Mearsheimer’s book, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.” This approach, rooted in a belief that the international system is inherently chaotic, suggests a state’s survival depends on curtailing the power of potential adversaries before they become threats.
In the absence of a central authority to enforce order, a “realist” logic prevails – those who don’t act to constrain others risk being constrained themselves. From this premise, Mearsheimer developed a strategy of “letting rivals fight,” encouraging conflicts between competing powers to exhaust their resources and capabilities.
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This strategy hinges on a simple but effective principle: instead of engaging in direct warfare, a state fosters clashes between two or more opponents, allowing them to deplete each other militarily, economically, and politically. The state then remains a spectator, preserving its own resources and benefiting from a new balance of power established without direct involvement in battle.
Mearsheimer differentiates this approach from “bleeding” a rival, which involves prolonging an existing war to prevent a decisive victory for either side. Both strategies represent subtle forms of indirect warfare, where conflict is waged through long-term planning and manipulation of power dynamics rather than direct military engagement.
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This philosophy was clearly demonstrated by British policy throughout the 19th century, when London actively fueled competition and wars between France and Germany within continental Europe, ensuring that neither emerged as a dominant power capable of threatening its interests or disrupting the balance of power that secured Britain’s imperial position.
Mearsheimer argues this approach wasn’t unique to Britain, but was adopted by other powers at different stages of modern history. During World War II, then-U.S. Senator and future President Harry Truman expressed a similar sentiment in 1941, following the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union: “If we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and that way they will kill as many of each other as possible.”
Today, the war in Ukraine embodies this logic, having undergone a profound transformation in recent years, evolving beyond a limited regional conflict into an arena crowded with intersecting interests of major global powers. The conflict’s scope has expanded, drawing in actors beyond Kyiv and Moscow.
Ukraine has become a stage for settling scores between poles of the East and West, spearheaded by three major interests: Russia, attempting to restore its regional dominance and reclaim its status as a great Eurasian power; the United States and NATO, seeking to weaken Moscow without direct engagement; and China, observing the scene strategically, supporting at times and balancing at others, according to an equation that preserves its economic gains and keeps Russia within its sphere of influence.
This entanglement of global powers has turned the war in Ukraine into a model of a proxy war, where Ukraine and Russia are used as tools in a broader struggle to define the future international order.
Further complicating the situation, a November 2024 analysis by the U.S.-based RAND Corporation concluded that the war has become an arena of indirect confrontation between Asian powers as well, with participation from East Asian nations unprecedented in scale. China is providing Russia with vital components to circumvent sanctions, and North Korea has sent approximately 10,000 soldiers and hundreds of rockets and artillery pieces to support Moscow, while Japan and South Korea have aligned with the West, providing financial, technical, and defense assistance to Ukraine.
This complex interplay of forces has made the war in Ukraine a complete model of a proxy war, with Ukraine and Russia serving as instruments in a wider struggle to determine the shape of the coming international order.
This raises a fundamental question: Does the West truly want this war to end? Washington sees its continuation as a means of draining Russia and preventing it from rebuilding its military strength, as former U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated in 2024, that the U.S. “wants to see Russia weakened.”
Conversely, some analysts believe China does not desire a decisive Russian victory that alters the balance of power, but may prefer Moscow to remain consistently preoccupied, making it more dependent on its economy and technology, and requiring its diplomatic protection against the West. At the same time, China does not want the West to triumph and expand into that volatile region. Analysts suggest that the continuation of the war may benefit China, with the United States preoccupied with supplying Ukraine and diverting its attention and resources from the Asian theater.
At the same time, other important interests intersect. Western arms companies are reaping huge profits from the surge in demand for ammunition and equipment, while China and other countries are exploiting the war to expand their dual-use trade and reshape global technology supply chains, serving their position in the global economy.
More clearly, the criteria for victory and defeat in a war like this have many facets, and major powers are seeking outcomes that suit their metrics. These metrics may not fully align with what the warring parties hope for.
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Figures confirm that the Moscow-Beijing alliance has entered a new phase, with the balance clearly tilting in favor of the latter. Trade volume between the two countries reached approximately $240 billion in 2024, but the trade volume obscures a more decisive reality: China accounts for about 36% of Russia’s imports, while Russia’s share of Chinese trade is only 5-6%, a disparity that reveals an unequal relationship, making Moscow an economically and technologically dependent partner, and Beijing the dominant party that holds the tools of influence and strategic benefit from the expansion and continuation of the war.
This dependence is reflected in major economic projects. China has filled the void left by European companies withdrawing from the Russian market, acquiring stakes in energy and banking sectors, and imposing favorable conditions on it in strategic projects such as the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline.
Analyses by the Delphi Global Institute suggest that Beijing is deliberately prolonging negotiations to exploit Moscow’s urgent need to dispose of its gas. On the technological level, the war has led to the spread of Chinese technology within Russia. Chinese companies have become the primary supplier of critical components used in the manufacture of weapons, accounting for about 90% of Russia’s imports in this sector, while China also provides approximately 70% of the mechanical manufacturing tools needed for military industries.
Companies like Huawei and ZTE have filled the void left by Western companies, raising Russian concerns about a transition to long-term technological dependence.
According to the Washington Post, China has significantly increased shipments of vital parts used to build drones used by Russian forces, including fiber optic cables essential for communication and guidance systems for those aircraft. The amount of these cables exported from China to Russia reached approximately 328,000 miles in August 2025, a record figure. Beijing also provided Russia with approximately $47 million worth of lithium-ion batteries in the same month.
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Furthermore, Western reports revealed that China is providing Russia with increasing intelligence support, enabling the Russian military to identify its targets more accurately and carry out more effective strikes. In October 2025, the Atlantic Council quoted a Ukrainian intelligence official confirming that Beijing had begun providing Moscow with high-resolution satellite images of Ukrainian sites for use in guiding missile strikes.
These accusations are not new. In 2023, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on seven Chinese companies suspected of providing “high-resolution satellite imagery.”
Much of this reality remains incomplete as long as the elements of the narrative are not fully revealed by the Russian and Chinese sides. But the absence of some details does not obscure the vision of the strategic realities on the ground, and understanding the spaces of alliance and contention that bring these forces together, and the nature of the ongoing collision to determine the balance of power for each party.
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On another front, the prolongation of the conflict does not only drain Russian power, but also aligns with the American vision of keeping Europe engaged in the burden of war. From this perspective, Washington achieves two goals at once: gradually weakening Moscow on the one hand, and occupying Europe economically and politically on the other, so that it remains dependent on the American security umbrella and unable to formulate an independent defense policy.
As Moscow continues to fight, Europe finds itself compelled to continuously rearm Ukraine, as well as prepare for new waves of Russian threats, which means draining its industrial and financial resources, so that the war – according to the American view – becomes a dual tool to weaken the Russian adversary and control the “European partner” within the Atlantic system.
According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, European NATO countries received more than 150 fighter jets and more than 60 attack helicopters from the United States over the past five years. As of the end of 2024, there were additional requests to purchase approximately 472 fighter jets and 150 combat helicopters from American companies.
These figures clearly reflect Europe’s growing defensive dependence on Washington, particularly in the field of advanced air power, which forms the backbone of NATO’s offensive and defensive capabilities. The requirements for maintaining this air power also require Europe to become more connected to the American logistical and technological infrastructure, which in turn reinforces American influence within the European military system.
Furthermore, data from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy shows that Europe became the first military financier of Ukraine in 2025, with the volume of defense aid through production and arms contracts reaching approximately 35.1 billion euros as of June, surpassing the United States, which provided less direct support. Significant contributions came from Germany, Norway, and Belgium, while Britain raised its overall military commitment to approximately 13 billion pounds, including 4.5 billion in 2025 to supply drones, radars, and vital spare parts.
Thus, Washington achieves its goals at the lowest direct cost, as the strategy of draining Moscow is managed through European arms, while American defense industries benefit from arms contracts, maintenance, and modernization, as confirmed by the Institute for Strategic and International Studies, which points out that U.S. support for Kyiv represented a historic opportunity to revive the American defense industrial base, as it became clear that American arms companies found in this reality an unprecedented opportunity to maximize their profits and expand their global influence.
According to reports, companies such as Lockheed Martin and RTX have achieved record profits, driven by the increased demand for weapons as a result of the war in Ukraine, including large contracts to produce F-35 fighters and missile defense systems for a number of allies, due to the desire of these countries to build a large strategic stockpile in anticipation of any potential security setbacks.
In conclusion, the war in Ukraine reveals a radical shift in the nature of modern conflicts: conflicts that are not fought for a quick resolution, but to manage the balance of power through systematic depletion. Russia is slowly bleeding on the battlefield, and Europe is being drained economically and politically within NATO’s embrace, while Washington rebuilds its military industry and reaffirms its leadership of the Western alliance.
Meanwhile, China is expanding its economic and technological influence at the expense of Moscow, and gaining strategic gains from the war that make it the quiet winner in the great game of depletion.
