The United States and Gulf states are seeking assistance from Ukraine in countering Iranian Shahed drones, revealing a critical defensive capability currently possessed solely by Ukrainian forces.
Just days into the conflict in the Gulf, a shift in global diplomatic dynamics is underway: the U.S. And several Gulf nations have requested Ukraine’s support in defending against Iranian Shahed-136 drones. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has confirmed receiving these requests.
This development marks a notable reversal of roles: Ukraine, once seeking aid, is now a sought-after partner. Since 2022, Russia has been using these same drones to attack Ukrainian cities, supplied by Iran. The Ukrainian military has gained significant experience with this weapon, and their expertise is now in demand in the Gulf.
Drone defense proves more challenging than initially anticipated
During a briefing on Tuesday in Washington, U.S. Officials reportedly acknowledged that Iranian Shahed drones present a substantial challenge. They indicated that American air defenses would not be able to intercept all incoming systems. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan Caine, stated that the drones are proving to be more problematic than initially expected.
The issue isn’t a lack of capability on the part of U.S. Forces and their allies to shoot down a Shahed-136. Rather, the concern is the ability to intercept hundreds of them without incurring unsustainable costs. Western estimates place the cost of a Shahed or its Russian variant, the Geran 2, at around $30,000 to $50,000. A Patriot interceptor missile, however, costs approximately $3 million. Firing such expensive missiles at inexpensive drones would result in an economic war that even the wealthy Gulf states are reluctant to fight. Ukraine has already learned to respond differently, and that knowledge is now being sought.
Zelenskyy acknowledged the situation, stating that assistance would be provided, but only if it doesn’t compromise Ukraine’s own war efforts. He indicated a willingness to support those who also support Ukraine. This statement echoes rhetoric previously used by Donald Trump, who had previously slowed deliveries of air defense weapons citing concerns about depleting his own stockpiles. The dynamic has now shifted. Kyiv is prepared to offer expertise and technology, a move also driven by diplomatic considerations. Ukrainian leadership hopes that Gulf states will leverage their influence to increase pressure on Moscow to end the war in Ukraine.
Evidence of close ties between Iran and Moscow has emerged from recovered drone debris. Fragments of a Shahed drone that crashed in the United Arab Emirates were marked with Cyrillic serial numbers. This suggests that parts of Iran’s arsenal are now of Russian origin.
The largest Shahed drone production facility is now located not in Iran, but in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan, Russia, near Yelabuga. Systems are being manufactured there at a significant rate. Ukrainian observers believe that Russia is now also providing modernized versions of the drones back to Tehran.
Ukrainian forces have spent the last four years developing cost-effective methods for defending against Shahed drones. Their approach involves point defense around critical infrastructure like power plants and urban centers, often utilizing simple tools such as night vision devices and heavy machine guns mounted on pickup trucks.
Beyond this, systems like the German Gepard anti-aircraft tank, with its 35mm cannon, have proven highly effective in Ukraine. It offers a more affordable alternative to missile-based air defense systems against the slow-flying Shahed drones.
Even more affordable are recent developments from the Ukrainian drone industry. Military startups like Wild Hornets and General Cherry are building small, inexpensive interceptor drones specifically designed to hunt Shaheds. These drones are launched from simple catapults or even by hand, ascend to several hundred meters, and locate their targets using thermal or optical sensors. Some are guided by ground radar or acoustic sensors, with the final phase controlled by a human pilot via radio or, in newer versions, by artificial intelligence. The interceptor drone either rams the target or detonates a small explosive charge.
Other models function not just as kamikaze drones. Some startups are experimenting with drones equipped with light machine guns or shotgun payloads that fire at close range. Others utilize nets or fragmentation charges. The principle remains the same: a cheap drone hunts a cheap drone. According to Ukrainian sources, the cost of these interceptor drones is up to ten times lower than the cost of building a Shahed. These defense drones are suitable for mass production within the domestic economy and do not necessitate to be expensively purchased from the U.S.
Israel and the U.S. Are also exploring latest, affordable ways to counter the Shahed threat. Israel is replicating an idea from Ukraine: using helicopters at night to hunt drones, shooting them down with machine guns. Israel can further develop this concept with its Apache Longbow attack helicopters and their AN/APG-78 Mast radar.
Also in use for the first time on US Navy warships in the Gulf, and in Israel, are laser weapons for drone defense. These weapons fundamentally alter the economic equation of drone warfare. Electricity, the ammunition for these systems, is virtually unlimited and costs only a few dollars or cents per engagement.
Lasers offer the lowest cost per intercept
In Israel, a new laser defense system called Iron Beam is now part of the country’s air defense system. Developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Elbit Systems, the system can destroy drones, rockets, and artillery shells. The Israeli Defense Ministry has reported successful intercepts and highlighted the system’s cost-effectiveness.
The U.S. Navy has installed the HELIOS high-energy laser on an Arleigh Burke destroyer. The Pentagon released images of the system on a destroyer off the coast of Iran – according to unconfirmed reports from various U.S. Media outlets, the laser has already shot down several small Iranian drones. The high-energy laser is from Lockheed Martin and is designed to counter drones, fast boats, and smaller missiles. HELIOS has been tested, and the limit for the number of shots is set only by the ship’s power supply.
The number of Shahed drones Iran still has in its arsenal, and the number of conventional air defense missiles available to the Gulf states and the U.S., is currently difficult to assess. However, the urgency of the request to Ukraine demonstrates that the Gulf states fear Iran can continue launching drones for longer than they can intercept them with their current systems.
A significant unknown is the volume of deliveries from Russia. The unfavorable balance of power is also attributable to NATO: Ukraine has been urgently requesting long-range cruise missiles, particularly Tomahawk missiles, for months to attack drone factories in Russian provinces. However, the U.S. Under Donald Trump has so far rejected these requests, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has also not yet delivered the Taurus missile promised during the election campaign.
If drone production in Russia were disrupted or completely halted, the supply situation with Shahed 136s might be different.
This article was created for the economic competence center of WELT and “Business Insider Germany.”
Economic editor Benedikt Fuest regularly reports on the AI race, technology, and armaments.
